Abstract Measurement and management of credit concentration risk is critical for banks and relevant for micro-prudential requirements. While several methods exist for measuring credit concentration risk within institutions, the systemic effect of different institutions' exposures to the same counterparties has been less explored so far. In this paper, we propose a measure of the systemic credit concentration risk that arises because of common exposures between different institutions within a financial system. This approach is based on a network model that describes the effect of overlapping portfolios. We calculate this measure of systemic network concentration on a few data sets reporting exposures of financial institutions and show that in several circumstances the effect of common exposures is orthogonal to the diversification of single portfolios. As a result, we show that an optimal solution that minimizes systemic risk is to be found in a balance between these two, typically different and rather divergent, effects. We use this measure to quantify systemic risk arising from credit concentration interconnectedness and calculate the additional capital corresponding to this particular type of risk. This adjustment is additional to both the original capital requirement from Basel II and the granularity adjustment of each portfolio. Although approximated, our common exposure adjustment is able to capture, with only two parameters, an aspect of systemic risk that goes beyond a view over single portfolios and analyzes the complexity of the interplay among (risk-adjusted) exposures.
Introduction
Concentration risk arises in a credit portfolio when there is an uneven distribution of exposures in the portfolio. This occurs in two ways: individual borrowers (single-name concentration) or groups of borrowers aggregated by sectors or geographical regions (sectoral concentration).
Concentrations are important because the Basel capital requirements assume infinite granularity, and do not take into account this risk. The theoretical foundations of Basel risk-based capital requirements are based on the Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) model, that assumes an infinitely large pool of loans resulting in a diversified credit risk portfolio [11] . This assumption enables an analytical solution for capital requirement calculation. Because of this, additional capital is required against this risk [2] .
From a micro-prudential perspective, credit concentration has been associated with increased risk of bank failures and increased magnitude of these failures when they occur. Credit concentrations are also important to macro-prudential supervisors when they have the responsibility of identifying and mitigating sources of systemic risk across the financial system. Several banks lending to the same counterparty is an example of system risk arising from credit concentration.
In reality, bank credit portfolios can have concentrated exposures relating to specific obligors or sectors depending on their business models. To capture this specific aspect of credit risk, credit concentration risk is specifically addressed in the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) as a capital surcharge, under Pillar 2. In Pillar 2 capital requirements, concentration risk charges apply to an individual institution. However, individual institutions can have overlapping portfolios of obligors, some of which may be important to individual banks and to the system as a whole.
The consequences of not appropriately measuring and mitigating credit concentration risk can be catastrophic. It has been a hallmark of several recent financial crises in Ireland and other OECD economies. Concentrations arise at several layers of disaggregation: first, at a sector level such as property, within that sector at a commercial property level, and then at a key number of large developers within that sector. Lending in this sector is particularly cyclical, and therefore subject to more abrupt declines in collateral values.
In the Irish crisis and the subsequent parliamentary inquiry that followed, one senior executive of an Irish credit institution recounted that the top 30 exposures accounted for over 50% of the bank's total exposure, and 48% of its profit. 1 That firm was subsequently liquidated. This problem has occurred previously as several banks suffered large losses related to Worldcom, Enron, and Parmalat, as well as the large commercial real estate losses experienced by US banks in the late 1980s ( [2] . ) We make three main contributions to existing research. The first one conceptualises credit risk using a system-wide approach based on network science. We integrate two strands of the research literature, credit risk measurement and network topological measures of relevance and contagion. Second, the approach is general and could be applied to traded asset portfolios, sectors or geographic areas by aggregating named counterparties. Third, we demonstrate using simulated and real-world data how this system wide credit concentration risk measure can be practically applied, by providing a quantitative estimate of the additional prudential capital that corresponds to this type of credit risk concentration.
Related work and research contribution
Various proposals exist for calculation of name or sector concentration risk to adjust the ASRF approach. For name concentration, existing methods are based on some form of granularity adjustment. These include the Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index or Gini. Depending on the implementation, these measures may not reflect changes in obligor risk [12, 10, 5] .
Sector concentration risk adjustments can also be undertaken using multi-factor models taking into account the systematic risk associated with that sector, or derive analytical approximations that require simplifying assumptions such as intra-sector correlations remaining constant.
Since the 2007 crisis, various types of inter-disciplinary approaches to measuring concentration risk have been developed. There is now a rich literature merging network theory with various approaches to measuring systemic risk. Work by [1] , and [14] , as well as earlier work by [13] and [6] , is closely related to this work. In their frameworks, similar to ours, they use bipartite networks to describe interconnectedness through various measures.
However, the primary purpose of their analysis is the mechanism of cascading failures driven by links through the interbank market. This is used to investigate the dynamics of cascading bank failures. In our approach, we are interested in identifying the different relevant factors to structural systemic risk with a focus on borrowers as the source of risk, rather than the dynamics of a cascading interbank failure. Our work focuses on distinguishing the effect of common exposures across banks, and not within banks. While this network effect is implicitly encapsulated in the works by [13] and [6] , we wish to make it explicit, and develop a measure that does not need to run long Monte Carlo simulations and can be used to calculate additional capital requirements specifically related to this type of risk.
In spirit, our approach is similar to [9] . The objective of his paper is to measure systemic risk in a flexible manner with the help of network based properties. However, the issue of varying risk or connectivity in response to exposures being added or removed from the system is not fully developed. In this paper, we focus on overlapping exposures and propose a methodology adopting network science tools that extend traditional measures of credit concentration. Finally, our work has some common elements with that [1] , in that we link common exposures to across the system to capital requirements. However, our credit risk mechanism is very different to the Creditmetrics approach used in their work.
Based on the existing research and the motivating examples given in the introduction, we require a framework that meets several requirements. First, it should take into account not only the presence of a connection, but its magnitude, and risk. Second, it should be tractable enough to decompose individual exposure contributions and their effect overall credit concentration risk within a given system. Third, it should also be able to quantify the effect concentrations within one bank on other banks. Finally, the framework should calculate the effect of changes in risky exposures through changes in the network topology. The objective of this work is to propose a framework that takes into consideration all these issues.
The new systemic indicator that we are about to illustrate in this paper draws on network science research on recommendation systems, in particular the paper by Zhou et al [18] . In recommendation systems, a model typically involves a set of users and a set of products. This system can also be represented by a bipartite network, characterized by a layer of users and a layer of products. Each user is connected to all the products that she has bought. Zhou et al define a metric that describes the similarity of two users based on their portfolio of collected products. Users' similarity can then be exploited by recommending those products that may appeal to users with similar characteristics. The original indicator is defined on an unweighted network, but the definition can be naturally extended to weighted networks [15] .
Methodology
This section outlines the methodology for measurement of systemic risk from common exposures taking into account the requirements outlined in the previous section. As the focus is on credit concentration risk, we only consider a simplified subset of a complex system involving lenders and borrowers.
We consider a set of n lenders and m borrowers, with the following simplifications/hypotheses:
1. We assume that lenders and borrowers are two distinct sets (e.g. we neglect interbank loans). 2. We neglect lenders liabilities structures.
These assumptions are reasonable as we want to focus on the structural nature of systemic risk, building on within single institution credit concentration risk. This problem can be represented as a bipartite network where one layer corresponds to the lenders and the other to their debts/loans (Fig. 1) .The link between a lender and a debt represents the exposure of the lender to to the debt of a given borrower. A common measure of portfolio concentration (e.g. for a bank) is the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI):
where the sums are calculated over the counterparties and E k is the exposure of the considered institution to the counterparty k. The HHI is a simple indicator that can be used to measure the credit concentration risk at the level of each considered institution. However, pairs of lenders may be exposed to the same debts/borrowers, generating further concentration risk on a system wide level. In practice, the HHI does not take into account the potential risk inherent to common exposures.
As mentioned earlier, our problem has similarities with the one investigated by Zhou et al [18] . In our case, we also have a bipartite network that comprises two layers: a layer of financial institutions (lenders) and a layer of counterparties (borrowers). Similarly to the network of users and products, here we wish to quantify the similarities in the composition of financial institutions portfolios. We therefore define a Dependence Index D based on a modification of the quantity proposed by [18] . Our Dependence Index is defined as the indicator in [18] except for the fact that the considered bipartite network of banks and counterparties is weighted, as in [15] .
To calculate the dependence index, we rescale exposures in a way that takes into consideration the risk of the corresponding counterparty. Let e ik be the exposure of lender i to the counterparty k. We define the risk adjusted exposure w ik of lender i to the counterparty k as
where f (r k ) is a function of r k , the estimated risk of entity k. This function modifies the unweighted exposure into a weighted exposure based on a risk measure for entity k. This risk measure could be a credit rating, and internal credit scale or probability of default (PD), or a market based indicator that can rank order credit risk, such as credit spreads.
At this stage, we project the bipartite network onto the lenders' layer. In other words, we create a singlelayer network where a directional link from i to j represents the size of impact of institution i to institution j, corresponding to the systemic effect of credit concentration due to common exposures. The adjacency matrix S = (s i j ) of this projection is calculated as
where w il is the element of the adjacency matrix of the bipartite network. We name this impact matrix, as it represents the impact that one portfolio has onto another one due to common exposures. More specifically, given two distinct lenders i and j, the element matrix s i j represents the impact that lender i has on lender j. For example, if the two portfolios have a large overlap, s i j will be higher. On the other hand, the matrix is not necessarily symmetric, i.e. s i j = s ji , whenever the two lenders have different total exposures. It is easy to see that the impact of a large lender on a small one will be larger than the one of a small lender to a large one. Finally, each element on the diagonal s ii represents a measure of the amount of esposures of lender i that are disconnected from other lenders. We define Dependence Index (D i ) of bank i as a measure of the independence of a bank's portfolio of exposures in relation with the other banks portfolios:
We can also naturally define a Dependence Index for the whole system as mean over D i , weighted by the total lenders exposures:
One can immediately see that D i values are comprised in the interval [0, 1], and it can be directly compared with the HHI index in (1), or its risk-adjusted version
It can be shown that the asymmetry of the matrix S is strictly related to the heterogeneity of the total size of exposures in different institutions. In particular, we have that s i j = s ji if and only if
The two indicators, H i and D i should be considered as complementary, as they encapsulate two different aspects of risk concentration, namely the concentration within the same portfolio and the concentration due to common exposures, respectively.
Properties of the Dependence Index
Indicators of inequality are often tested against a number of properties [7, 16, 17] . Therefore, we analyse some properties of the dependence index D.
Minimum dependence
Dependence D i of lender i is zero if and only if when lender i has no co-exposures.
We can define this concept more formally as
This is immediately evident from the definition (4).
Transfer to co-exposures
If a lender transfers a fraction of an exposure to an isolated counterparty to a co-exposed counterparty, by an amount that is small compared with the exposure size, the dependence of that lender increases. We can see this by focusing on a bipartite network with two lenders (A and B), three counterparties (1,2,3) and the following matrix of exposures:
This is the building block of a bipartite network of common exposures (Fig. 2) . If we transfer a quantity ε > 0 from the isolated exposure 1 to the common exposure 2 as in
we can study the effect on the dependence indexes as a function of ε. A direct calculation shows that ∂ D i (ε)/∂ ε ≥ 0 for i = A, B, so does D sys by definition.
Merging of common exposures (superadditivity)
If two common exposures merge, the Dependence indicator of the involved lenders increases. Let us consider the simplified case of a network with two lenders and two common exposures (Fig. 3a) , described by the weight matrix:
We wish to study the difference in the dependence indicators with the corresponding network characterized by a merging of the two counterparties, i. e.
where w A3 = w A1 + w A2 , w B3 = w B1 + w B2 (Fig. 3b) . 
increases the systemic interdependence. The exception is a particular case when the relative exposure of the two lenders to the two counterparties is exactly the same.
Effect of isolated exposures
If a lender transfers a fraction of an exposure to a new counterparty that has not borrowed from other lenders, by an amount that is small compared with the exposure size, the dependence index of the system decreases.
To see that, we can use the same setting as in Section 4.2, where w A1 = 0 and we consider the transfer
, and therefore D sys ≤ D sys by definition.
Data
In this paper, we use three data sets.
Data Set 1 (DS1)
The Data Set 1 reports a sample of the real estate and corporate books of two banks. The sample covers approximatively 30% of each banks' book. Exposures are aggregated by group, so each name corresponds to an independent counterparty. The total number of counterparties is 1100, with only 9 of them that are common to both banks. Each bank also reports an estimation of the risk associated to each counterparty. They identify four levels of risk that we label from 1 (the safest) to 4 (the most risky).
Data Set 2 (DS2)
The Data Set 2 reports the 100 largest exposures from 4 banks. The exposures are aggregated by counterparty name at the highest level of consolidation. The data set does not report information about the risk of any counterparty. Therefore, we assign credit risk classes from 1 to 4 using the distribution observed in Data Set 1. In this procedure, we also give a higher risk to borrowers that are in the overlap. In doing this we assign risk categories according to the distribution observed in DS1 (see also Sec. 6.2). Finally, we translate credit classes into PDs by using a simplified version of the conversion adopted by Gordy and Lutkebohmert [12] .
Data Set 3 (DS3)
The Data Set 3 reports large exposures from 4 banks. The exposures are aggregated by counterparty name at the highest level of consolidation. More specifically, the data set reports: exposures at default (EAD), probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD). The data set reports two snapshots of the 4 banks in two consecutive years (2016 and 2017).
Analysis of common exposures
In this Section, we analyze the structure of common exposures in DS1 and DS3.
Construction of the bipartite network
The first step in constructing the bipartite network of exposures is to identify the risk-adjusted exposures. In DS3, it is natural to use the product PD · EAD. In DS1, as we only have a discrete risk classification, we use the following method. First, we create a homogeneous classification of counterparties' risk by matching the assessments from each bank. Wherever the two classifications of the same counterparty do not match, we choose the highest (riskier) one. In order to calculate the risk weighted exposures as in (2), we consider the weight function:
where a = 0.2, b = 1 and r 0 = 1.5. In practice, we consider two categories of risk (r = 1 on one hand and r > 1 on the other), and give to the low risk exposure a 20% weight with respect to the high risk exposures. This mimics typical rules of calculation of risk weighted assets [3].
6.2 Analysis of common exposures and portfolio overlap
DS1
The matrix of impacts between A and B is fairly symmetrical:
We can get more insights into this by looking at the calculated properties of the two lenders in Table 2 . As the fraction of portfolio overlap is only between 3 and 4%, the matrix of impacts shows a weakly coupled (most of the weight is on the diagonal) and symmetric behavior. HHI and D move in opposite directions, as expected: bank A has a slightly more concentrated portfolio, but it is less susceptible to systemic stress, bank B has a less concentrated portfolio, but it is more susceptible to the systemic risk due to common exposures. We can investigate this further and project the bipartite network on the counterparty side (Fig. 4 shows the network of the largest counterparties). In this projection, the weight of the links represents the interconnectedness of two borrowers in the portfolios. The interconnectedness between two counterparties increases with the size of common exposures across different lenders. Fig. 5 displays the composition of the portfolios in terms of risk categories. We can see that while the risk composition of portfolios A and B are fairly similar, the overlap is much more skewed towards higher risk. In particular, we observe that the fraction of exposures in risk category 1 (the safest) are about 9% for bank A and B, whereas it is only 3% in the overlap.
The indicator of systemic interdependence D sys also allows us to assess how distributed is the risk across different portfolios. If the overlap between two portfolios were random, the risk distribution of the overlap should be similar to the one of the two portfolios. However, Figure 5 shows that this is not the case. Therefore, we can use the indicator D sys to quantify this difference. In order to do that, we randomly rewire the network and calculate the probability of the scenario observed in the data. We shuffle named counterparties without changing the risk composition of each bank's portfolio. As a result, the properties that are usually used to measure risk concentration at the bank level do not change. At each randomization, both the HHI and the number of counterparties in the overlap remain the same, and only the link weights within risk categories are permutated. Our indicator D sys of systemic interdependence, though, does change. Fig. 6 shows the distribution of values of D sys after N = 10 5 randomizations. The probability of observing a value larger than D sys = 3.4 · 10 −4 , measured from the data, is about 0.36%. The observed value of D sys is more than 13 standard deviations from the mean. This shows that the portfolio overlap between the two institutions is highly non-random, and skewed towards higher interdependence. The indicator of systemic interdependence D sys allows us to give a quantitative estimation of this phenomenon.
DS3
The matrix of impacts of the four lenders is: As we can see, the interplay of co-exposure impacts is more complex than in DS1. The concentration properties of the four lenders are displayed in Table 2 and the two calculated indexes are plotted in Fig. 7 .
In this data set, there is a sizeable overlap among portfolios, however, this does not always translate into high inter-bank impacts, due to the different sizes of the lenders involved. This is also at the origin of the asymmetry of impacts between lenders C and D and lenders A and B. This is also reflectd in Fig. 7 as lender D has a comparable HHI to lenders A and B, but a much higher interdependence, whereas lender C has a small Dependence Index due to its low interconnectedness with the rest of the system. 
Resilience of the system to increased credit risk
We now test the effect that increasing the risk of counterparties may have on the portfolios interdependence in DS1. First, we imagine a scenario where one of the two low risk (risk category 1) counterparties in the portfolio overlap is downgraded. Table 3 shows that a downgrade of either counterparty (ID 3 and 9) generates an increase of both D A and D B . We can study the convexity of the Dependence Indicator by downgrading both counterparties. 
Resilience of the system to an increase in overlapping counterparties
We study the effect of overlap increase by rewiring isolated exposures into common exposures. At each iteration, we randomly choose two non-overlapping counterparties, in the same risk class, and merge them, so that they become a common exposure. As in the previous tests, this rewiring does not change the properties of each portfolio at the bank level, such as the HHI, the risk composition and the total exposure. Fig. 8 shows the effect of overlap increase as measured by D sys in DS1. The small non-monotonic jumps are due to the finite number of trials. In fact, it is possible to show that the range of D sys increases quite rapidly with the increase of overlap.
Sensitivity of the system to an increase of borrowers' risk
A way to characterize the systemic importance of single borrowers is to study the effect that an increase in their risk may have on global indicators. In order to do that, we set every borrower in the low risk category and calculate the change in D sys and HHI sys before and after having set each borrower in the high risk category. We define risk category 1 as low risk, whereas all the other categories (2, 3, and 4) as high risk. Shifting a borrower from low to high risk effectively means to multiply by a factor 5 all the exposures corresponding to it. The choice of 5 mimics a typical risk weight prescription of giving 20% of EAD to top tier counterparties and 100% to other counterparties. Figure 9 shows the result of this test in DS2. We plot the set of points with ∆ D sys > 0, corresponding to the borrowers in the overlap. From this scatterplot it transpires that a narrow interval in ∆ HHI sys may correspond to a quite diverse behavior in terms of ∆ D sys . This is another sign of the extra information brought in by the Finally, we compare the systemic interdependence sensitivity ∆ D sys with well known network centrality measures. The centrality measure that most resembles the behavior of ∆ D sys is the eigenvector centrality ( Figure 10) . Although less precise in describing the co-exposure effect, from this data set it appears that eigenvector centrality could be considered as an alternative in capital calculations.
Additional capital requirements of common exposures
The Internal Ratings Based (IRB) capital requirement and the Granularity Adjustment (GA) formula provide an estimation of the capital needed by an institution to be functioning in the occurrence of economic downturns. In this Section, we wish to calculate a third term, the further additional capital that is required to consider the systemic risk due to common exposures. 
where the sum runs over all the exposures of the considered lender, s i is the fraction of exposure to borrower i, and K i is defined as
where Φ(x) is the cumulative normal distribution and Φ −1 (x) its inverse, q is the q th chosen percentile of the (normally distributed) systematic risk factor, ρ i is the correlation between the returns of borrower i and the systematic risk factor, and MA i is the maturity adjustment, that is estimated as
where
Typically, one sets q = 0.999. As it is well-known, the Basel formula (12) is written for a portfolio that is infinitely granular. It is then necessary to add a Granularity Adjustment (GA). Here we use the Granularity Adjustment proposed by [12] :
where R i is the loan-loss reserve
δ is a regulatory parameter that is calibrated as δ = 4.83 and C i is defined as
where γ = 0.25 [12] .
Common exposure adjustment
In order to estimate this capital add-on, we need a quantity that can give us a measure of the relevance of each borrower in the common exposure risk. As we have seen in Section 6, the increment in the Dependency Index under credit risk increase (∆ D i ) measures exactly that. In analogy with (13), we combine the PD and the Dependency Index and define the corresponding capital requirement as
where θ (x) is the step function; in other words, we only consider positive increments of dependence (∆ D i > 0). When a borrower i is not in the overlap, i.e. only linked to a single institution, its contribution to X CE is zero (note that Φ −1 (0.5) = 0). This formula depends on the parameter η, that governs the weight of the systemic co-exposure effect with respect to the other capital requirements. The measure in (19), however, needs to be calibrated to avoid that part of the risk encapsulated in this term is already considered in the GA term. This typically occurs when the Granularity Adjustment increases as a function of the overlap. If this happens for a particular system, it means that the GA is able to capture, at least in part, the concept that larger overlap among portfolios requires more additional capital. On the other hand, for many systems, it is quite possible that also the opposite way may be true: the GA decreasing as the overlap increases. This can typically occur when the overlap is small enough that a small increase actually improves the granularity of the single portfolios, for example if exposures are transfered from large to small counterparties.
Therefore, let us exploit this observation and distinguish relative exposures s i whether they are in the overlap (i.e. they are shared by at least two lenders) or not, by defining Ω the set of borrowers in the overlap and Z the set of borrowers not in the overlap, and re-write the Granularity Adjustment (16) as
By defining the means over each subset Ω and Z as
respectively, we can approximate the formula as
In order to study how the GA behaves with respect to overlap, we assume a small perturbation ε of the exposures fractions s: Γ (s ) = (s + ε). The perturbation increases slightly the overlap and decreases the non-overlap by the same amount, more specifically
where ε > 0, N Ω is the number of borrowers in the overlap and N Z = N − N Ω is the number of borrowers outside the overlap. This perturbation increases overlap without changing the total exposures of the considered lender (∑ i ε i = 0) .
After imposing the conditions (25), the overlap in the GA is encapsulated by the scalar parameter ε and we can study how the GA increases with it:
Equation (26) is satisfied if and only if
Equation (27) gives an estimate on the amount of double counting between the GA and our co-exposure capital X CE , to correct the capital adjustment. We propose then a total capital requirement that reads
where we define the Common Exposure Capital Adjustment K CE as
The two parameters (α and η) govern the capital add-on due to common exposures. The term [α(r − 1) + 1] is designed in such a way that when double counting occurs, the co-exposure capital requirement decreases linearly with r.
Parameter calibration and application to real data
The calibration of parameters α and η is obtained by comparison with numerical simulations.
Numerical simulations
We perform numerical simulations using as an input the PDs reported in DS3, the data set with the largest overlap. For each lender, we calculate the distribution of losses by uniformly generating random numbers for each borrower i and comparing it with their corresponding PD i . In the present work we use 10 5 iterations. We then calculate the Value-at-Risk (VaR) at q = 0.999 and the expected losses EL. The unexpected losses are simply the difference UL = VaR − EL. We perform these simulations both with the reported data and in a simplified stress test scenario. The stress test scenario is defined by a new set of PDs that encapsulate a downturn in the economy. The new probabilities of default PD S are defined as
where A = 0.3. We adopt this definition to mimic the effect of a downturn to probabilities of default.
Parameter calibration
In order to calibrate the parameters α and η, we choose a data set and compare the results of the numerical simulations in the downturn scenario with the analytical capital requirements resulting from the sum of the capital calculated in the IRB infinitely granular approach (12) plus the Granularity Adjustment (16) . The difference between the analytically calculated capital and the estimation from the numerical simulations constitutes a gap that we use to calibrate the parameters, by setting this gap equal to the common exposure adjustment K CE .
This method is not driven by the quite strong assumption that the gap can be entirely explained by the systemic effect of common exposures. Rather, it aims to use the gap as a guide towards a typical scale to which it seems sensible to measure a further capital requirement. In real terms, the systemic effect of common exposures may be larger than what can be captured by Monte Carlo simulations that, differently from the dependency index and analogous network measures, focus on one portfolio at the time. Table 4 calculates this gap using Data Set 3 (year 2016). With the exception of lender C, the analytically calculated capital requirement (K +Γ ) is smaller than the unexpected losses simulated numerically. In the case of lender C, the level of risk of the portfolio appears instead to be completely captured by K +Γ . Therefore, in the case of lender C we set K CE = 0. For the other three lenders, instead, we set the gap equal to the co-exposure capital K CE in (29) and use the method of the least squares to fit the parameters. We obtain:
Using the parameters in (31) we can then calculate K CE for the other year of DS3. Table 5 shows the results of this calculation as well as a comparison with the numerical calculation. As we can see, after calibration with a different data set, the capital add-on K CE is able to capture quite well the gap between K + Γ and the simulated UL.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a new measure of credit concentration risk that encapsulates the systemic effect of interconnectedness due to common exposures. Our approach is to measure credit concentration risk at the system level, rather than separately looking at each financial institution portfolios individually. We show that this indicator satisfies the required mathematical properties and is able to summarize the degree of interdependence in a network of exposures. We test the indicator on a number of data sets of partially overlapping portfolios of financial institutions. Even in the case of low overlap, we show that the indicator is able to describe the effect of credit risk increase and capture non-linear effects due to the interplay of exposure connectivity. The interdependence analysis also provides insights into the properties of the overlap itself. In particular, we show that the portfolio overlap between two institutions may be highly non-random, and skewed towards higher interdependence. This may be due to a number of reasons: tendence of high risk borrowers to be indebted to multiple institutions, lower credit rating of larger borrowers, tendence of a bank to allow extra credit to a distressed borrower, etc. Investigating these causal relationships is beyond the scope of the present work, but the Dependence Indicator allows us to give a quantitative estimation of this phenomenon. We also explore the effect of overlap increase and find that the indicator correctly moves to higher and higher values. The corresponding increase in the width of the distribution of D sys with the overlap, though, shows that the topology of the network of exposures plays a substantial role in affecting systemic resilience.
This measure can be used to calculate an adjustment to the capital requirement that quantifies the systemic effect of common exposures in a network of financial institutions. The capital add-on is additional to both the original capital requirement from Basel II and the granularity adjustment later developed. We also develop an approximated methodology to avoid double counting between the granularity adjustment and the co-exposure adjustment. This method is quite general and it can be used in other capital adjustments, as it only depends on general properties of the analytical description of the capital requirement. Although approximated, our co-exposure adjustment is able to capture, with only two parameters, an aspect of systemic risk that, to our knowledge, has been neglected so far and the complexity in the interplay among (risk-adjusted) exposures. This is an essential step in developing a more comprehensive methodology to supervise and manage credit risk in a complex system of financial institutions.
